This 2008 mint condition note is in uncirculated condition and like all One Hundred Dollars banknotes there are not so many printed as the smaller denominations.
The previous printing run for $100 notes was 1999 so this issue here was the first to be released in 9 years.
Aleady in less than a decade the note has almost doubled in value.
If your serious about long term collecting for a great investment return then this is a great addition.
History
In July 1915 Monash learned of his tardy promotion to brigadier general at a time when wild rumours were circulating in Cairo, London and Melbourne that he had been shot as a German spy and traitor; there had been a similar vicious whispering campaign in Melbourne the previous October. The brigade now prepared for the battle of Sari Bair and its part in the left hook on Hill 971. Their night-march of 6 August was delayed and a vital wrong turning made. Monash forced himself to the front, punched his battalions into position and made good progress against moderate resistance. But the maps were faulty, the men were lost and exhausted, and next morning could only dig in. On the 8th, after attacking, they had to withdraw. Most of the men were sick, many had paratyphoid. The remnants then took part in the unsuccessful attacks on Hill 60, before being withdrawn to Lemnos. Monash had three weeks leave in Egypt where he learned of his appointment as C.B. The brigade returned to a quiet sector on Gallipoli. On the final night of the evacuation Monash was not one of the last to leave, but rashly sent home an illegal diary-letter implying that he had been. Gallipoli had given him a devastating education. Bean, Birdwood and others left an impression that his performance had been mediocre; but his brigade had performed at least as well as any of the other three and he had little or no part in the battle-plans he had to attempt to carry out. His performance on 7-8 August is open to criticism, but it came to be recognized that the attack on Hill 971 was totally impossible of achievement. Bean reported the saying that Monash ‘would command a division better than a brigade and a corps better than a division’.
In July 1915 Monash learned of his tardy promotion to brigadier general at a time when wild rumours were circulating in Cairo, London and Melbourne that he had been shot as a German spy and traitor; there had been a similar vicious whispering campaign in Melbourne the previous October. The brigade now prepared for the battle of Sari Bair and its part in the left hook on Hill 971. Their night-march of 6 August was delayed and a vital wrong turning made. Monash forced himself to the front, punched his battalions into position and made good progress against moderate resistance. But the maps were faulty, the men were lost and exhausted, and next morning could only dig in. On the 8th, after attacking, they had to withdraw. Most of the men were sick, many had paratyphoid. The remnants then took part in the unsuccessful attacks on Hill 60, before being withdrawn to Lemnos. Monash had three weeks leave in Egypt where he learned of his appointment as C.B. The brigade returned to a quiet sector on Gallipoli. On the final night of the evacuation Monash was not one of the last to leave, but rashly sent home an illegal diary-letter implying that he had been. Gallipoli had given him a devastating education. Bean, Birdwood and others left an impression that his performance had been mediocre; but his brigade had performed at least as well as any of the other three and he had little or no part in the battle-plans he had to attempt to carry out. His performance on 7-8 August is open to criticism, but it came to be recognized that the attack on Hill 971 was totally impossible of achievement. Bean reported the saying that Monash ‘would command a division better than a brigade and a corps better than a division’.
Select Bibliography
G. Serle, John Monash: A Biography (Melb, 1982) and for bibliography
P. Pedersen, Monash as Military Commander (Melb, 1985).